

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700314



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 14 March 1970


NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only


~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



1968-1970

weekly average
for each month



OCTOBER 1969 - MARCH 1970

weekly data as reported, Jan-Feb-Mar
weekly average per month, Oct-Dec



US BATTLE DEATHS increased to 103 from last week's 88.





SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS rose to 262 compared to last week's 242. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.





INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE numbered four four-digit groups, two of which had previously been accepted as "gap-fills," and one "QL" group for a total of about 1,350 personnel. Since 23 October, some 47,000 to 48,000 have entered the pipeline.



ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS dropped sharply to 526 from last week's 616.



ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION increased to 2,382 from last week's 2,105.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces increased significantly to 53% from the previous week's 47%.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

This week witnessed a drop in enemy-initiated activity coupled with a sharp rise in enemy casualties. The increased casualty rate seems to be largely the result of increased activity by friendly forces operating close in to enemy base areas during the reporting period. Major enemy units generally continued to remain in their base areas without any indications of imminent deployment out of them.

A COSVN directive recently captured in IV Corps, indicates that the enemy will continue to husband his troops in the delta at least for the foreseeable future. The directive is addressed to the VC commander of Military Region 2 (and presumably M.R. 3, i.e., the entire IV Corps area). It notes that NVA reinforcements were dispatched to IV Corps last year to shore up a rapidly deteriorating situation by attacking the GVN's pacification effort and to rebuild local Viet Cong units. Large operations are cautioned against (but not ruled out); the implication being that Viet Cong regional commanders are not to expend these units in impressive but costly engagements or attacks against urban areas. The document also states that the NVA reinforcements have been ordered to be prepared to take control of the civilian population of IV Corps in the event of a political solution to the war.

Enemy Infiltration

Infiltration inputs continued at a relatively low level. Four four-digit groups, two of which had previously been accepted as "gap-fills," and one "QL" group were detected in North Vietnam during the week. These four groups had a total strength of 1,359. Acceptance of these groups raises the infiltration estimate for the first two weeks of March to over 4,100 and the estimate of personnel entering the pipeline since 23 October 1969 to some 47,000 to 48,000. Overall, 65 four-digit groups have been detected in North Vietnam, 27 detected in Laos, and 10 "gap-fill" groups not yet actually detected have been accepted in the estimate through exercise of our "gap-fill" methodology.

South Vietnam Developments

There was a notable improvement in the growth, capabilities, and activity of the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) during 1969. For example, in January the VNAF flew only 18 percent of the total USAF/VNAF fixed wing strike sorties, whereas it flew 36 percent in November. Furthermore, the VNAF flew about 11,000 helicopter combat sorties in November, compared with only 170 during January. The VNAF is also growing stronger -- the present inventory of 451 aircraft (up from 267 in 1968) is expected to double by the end of 1971.

25X1X4

Other Developments

North Vietnam has so far taken a conciliatory line in its treatment of the anti-Vietnamese disturbances in Phnom Penh, apparently to let tempers cool and to stall for time until Sihanouk returns to Cambodia later this week. Sihanouk is probably more inclined than the Lon Nol cabinet to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem of Communist troops in Cambodia, since he has a high regard for the longer range need to maintain friendly relations with Communists. The low combat effectiveness of Cambodia's 37,000-man army is a further deterrent to precipitate action. On the other hand, any substantial concessions by Sihanouk to the Communists on the issue of the Communist presence would place him in a direct confrontation with political and military figures who have already demonstrated a willingness and ability to challenge his authority.

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